Refactor API routes to improve error handling and optimize performance; update documentation for clarity.

2026-07-21 16:25:51 +02:00
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+# Security Assessment Report
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Report ID** | ZYROX-SEC-2026-001 |
+| **Target** | ZyroX CV2 AIO Discord Bot with Dashboard |
+| **Repository** | `ZyroX-CV2-AIO-With-Dashboard-main` |
+| **Assessment Date** | 2026-07-21 |
+| **Report Version** | 1.0 |
+| **Classification** | Internal — Distribution Restricted |
+| **Assessment Type** | Static source-code review, configuration analysis, threat modeling |
+| **Assessor** | Independent security review (automated + manual verification) |
+
+---
+
+## Document Control
+
+| Version | Date | Author | Changes |
+|---------|------|--------|---------|
+| 1.0 | 2026-07-21 | Security Review | Initial assessment |
+
+**Scope:** Full repository including `bot/` (Python/discord.py), `bot/api/` (FastAPI), and `dashboard/` (Next.js). Out of scope: runtime penetration testing, infrastructure review, third-party Lavalink/OpenAI endpoints.
+
+**Methodology:**
+1. Recursive static analysis of source tree (~200+ Python/TypeScript files)
+2. Configuration default and `.env.example` review
+3. Identification of trust boundaries (Discord ↔ Bot ↔ API ↔ Dashboard ↔ Internet)
+4. Mapping findings to [CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/) where applicable
+5. Severity assignment per internal scale (Critical → Informational)
+
+**Limitations:** This assessment reflects the codebase state at review time. No dynamic exploitation was performed against a live deployment. Residual risk may exist in unreviewed dependencies.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Executive Summary
+
+A security review of the ZyroX CV2 AIO Discord bot (originally published by CodeX Devs) was conducted to determine whether the repository contains malicious code and to identify exploitable misconfigurations.
+
+### 1.1 Malware Classification
+
+| Indicator | Result |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Known malware signatures (trojan, RAT, cryptominer, token stealer) | Not observed |
+| Obfuscated or packed payloads | Not observed |
+| Committed binary artifacts (`.exe`, `.dll`, `.sh`) | None |
+| Covert C2 / unknown outbound endpoints | Not observed |
+| Intentional third-party control primitives | **Confirmed** (see Findings) |
+
+**Verdict:** The codebase does **not** exhibit characteristics of traditional malware. However, **default configuration and hardcoded identifiers create effective pre-positioned access** for third parties if an operator deploys without modification. This pattern is classified as **latent supply-chain / configuration backdoor risk**, not as a self-propagating trojan.
+
+### 1.2 Risk Overview
+
+| Severity | Count | Representative Issues |
+|----------|-------|---------------------|
+| Critical | 3 | Hardcoded owner fallback, Jishaku RCE, command telemetry webhook |
+| High | 3 | Hardcoded log channels, exposed API surface, client-side API key |
+| Medium | 3 | `eval()` usage, runtime package/binary fetch, deceptive commands |
+| Low | 1 | Developer branding / optional telemetry hooks |
+| **Total** | **10** | |
+
+**Operational impact if deployed with defaults:** A third-party Discord account retains bot owner privileges; command metadata and guild join events may be exfiltrated to external Discord channels/webhooks; owner-level Jishaku access enables host-level code execution.
+
+---
+
+## 2. System Overview & Attack Surface
+
+### 2.1 Architecture
+
+```
+                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
+                    │           Trust Boundary            │
+  Discord Users ───►│  discord.py Gateway (bot/CodeX.py)  │
+                    │         │              │            │
+                    │         ▼              ▼            │
+                    │    SQLite (bot/db/)  FastAPI :8000  │
+                    │                           │         │
+  Web Users ───────►│  Next.js Dashboard :3000 ◄┘         │
+                    │         │                           │
+                    │         ▼ (optional)                  │
+                    │  Cloudflare Tunnel → Internet       │
+                    └─────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+### 2.2 Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Authentication | Authorization Gap (pre-remediation) |
+|----------|----------------|-------------------------------------|
+| Discord → Bot | Discord token, owner ID list | Owner list defaulted to third party |
+| Bot → External webhooks/channels | None (hardcoded destinations) | Unauthenticated telemetry sink |
+| Dashboard → Bot API | Bearer `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` | No Discord permission binding |
+| Browser → Dashboard API | OAuth session (partial) | API key embedded in client bundle |
+| Internet → FastAPI | API key only when tunnel enabled | Binds `0.0.0.0` by default |
+
+### 2.3 Expanded Attack Surface
+
+Beyond a typical Discord bot, this project includes:
+
+| Component | Path | Notes |
+|-----------|------|-------|
+| Web dashboard | `dashboard/` | OAuth, guild configuration UI |
+| REST API | `bot/api/` | Full guild config CRUD |
+| Cloudflare tunnel | `bot/utils/tunnel.py` | Optional public exposure |
+| Lavalink integration | `bot/cogs/commands/music.py` | External dependency |
+| AI modules | `bot/cogs/commands/ai.py` | External API calls |
+| Embedded games/utilities | `bot/games/`, various cogs | Expanded code surface |
+
+These components are **in scope for the product design** but increase exposure relative to a minimal bot.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Detailed Findings
+
+Findings are indexed as `ZYROX-2026-NNN`. Severity uses: **Critical**, **High**, **Medium**, **Low**, **Informational**.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-001 — Hardcoded Owner ID Fallback
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Critical |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-1188](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1188.html) — Insecure Default Initialization of Resource |
+| **CVSS 3.1 (est.)** | 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated in `SECURITY_FIXES.md` (#1) |
+
+**Affected component:** `bot/utils/config.py`
+
+**Description:** When `OWNER_IDS` is absent from environment configuration, the bot falls back to a hardcoded Discord snowflake belonging to the original maintainer.
+
+```python
+OWNER_IDS: list[int] = _parse_ids("OWNER_IDS", [870179991462236170])
+```
+
+**Impact:** Unconfigured deployments grant **full bot owner privileges** to UID `870179991462236170`, including process restart (`reload`), cross-guild moderation, global blacklist, invite generation, and access to Jishaku (Finding 002).
+
+**Evidence:** `bot/utils/config.py`; additional third-party IDs present in `bot/.env.example`.
+
+**Owner-capable commands (non-exhaustive):** `reload`, `leaveguild`, `makeinvite`, `GB`, `global kick`, `global timeout`, `blacklist user/guild`.
+
+**Remediation:**
+- Remove hardcoded fallback; fail closed or warn when `OWNER_IDS` is empty
+- Replace example IDs with placeholders
+- Operator must set `OWNER_IDS=<own_discord_id>`
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-002 — Jishaku Extension Enabled by Default
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Critical |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-78](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html) / [CWE-94](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html) |
+| **CVSS 3.1 (est.)** | 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#2) |
+
+**Affected component:** `bot/CodeX.py` (~L345)
+
+```python
+await client.load_extension("jishaku")
+```
+
+**Description:** [Jishaku](https://github.com/Gorialis/jishaku) provides an in-Discord Python REPL restricted to bot owners. Any principal in `OWNER_IDS` can execute arbitrary Python on the host process.
+
+**Impact:** Full host compromise under owner account compromise or misconfigured `OWNER_IDS` (chained with Finding 001).
+
+**Remediation:** Load Jishaku only when `JISHAKU_ENABLED=true`; default `false`. Never enable in production.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-003 — Command Telemetry via Discord Webhook
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Critical |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-359](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/359.html) — Exposure of Private Personal Information |
+| **CVSS 3.1 (est.)** | 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#3) |
+
+**Affected component:** `bot/CodeX.py` → `on_command_completion`
+
+**Description:** Non-owner command invocations are POSTed to `CMD_WEBHOOK_URL` with command text, user ID, guild name/ID, and channel ID. Owner commands are explicitly excluded from logging.
+
+**Impact:** Webhook controller receives **cross-guild activity intelligence**. Privacy violation; potential GDPR relevance depending on jurisdiction.
+
+**Remediation:** Disable by default; validate URL before enabling; use operator-controlled webhook only.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-004 — Hardcoded Discord Channel IDs for Telemetry
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | High |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-798](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html) — Use of Hard-coded Credentials (analogous) |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#4) |
+
+**Affected components:**
+
+| File | Channel ID | Function |
+|------|------------|----------|
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | `1396794297386532978` | Guild join notifications |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | `1419729255977189467` | Server count display |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | `1419729283861184632` | Member count display |
+| `bot/cogs/events/on_guild.py` | `1396794297386532978` | Join/leave detail logs |
+| `bot/cogs/commands/np.py` | `1396794297386532978` | No-prefix command audit |
+
+**Impact:** Guild metadata (name, owner, member count, invite links) transmitted to channels controlled by the original developer.
+
+**Remediation:** Externalize to `LOG_CHANNEL_ID`, `SERVER_COUNT_CHANNEL_ID`, `USER_COUNT_CHANNEL_ID`; no logging when unset.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-005 — Over-Exposed FastAPI with Optional Public Tunnel
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | High |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-284](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html) — Improper Access Control |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Partially remediated (#5, #10) |
+
+**Affected components:** `bot/api/server.py`, `bot/utils/tunnel.py`, `bot/CodeX.py`
+
+**Description:** API listens on `0.0.0.0:8000` by default. Cloudflare tunnel can expose localhost to the public internet. Authentication is a single shared bearer token without per-guild Discord authorization (pre-fix).
+
+**Sensitive endpoints (sample):**
+- `PATCH /api/v1/guilds/{id}/automod`
+- `PATCH /api/v1/guilds/{id}/antinuke`
+- `PATCH /api/v1/guilds/{id}/verification`
+- `PATCH /api/v1/admin/config`
+
+**Impact:** API key compromise → full configuration manipulation across all guilds.
+
+**Remediation:** Default `API_ENABLED=false`, `API_HOST=127.0.0.1`, `TUNNEL_ENABLED=false`; bind Discord OAuth token + guild admin checks (Fix #10).
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-006 — API Key Embedded in Client Bundle
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | High |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-522](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/522.html) — Insufficiently Protected Credentials |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#6) |
+
+**Affected component:** `dashboard/lib/api.ts`
+
+```typescript
+const API_KEY = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY;
+```
+
+**Description:** Next.js inlines `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` variables into client JavaScript. Any dashboard visitor can extract the bearer token.
+
+**Impact:** Unauthenticated API access if combined with reachable bot API (Finding 005).
+
+**Remediation:** Server-side proxy route; `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` server-only; remove `NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY`.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-007 — Unsafe Dynamic Code Evaluation (`eval`)
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Medium |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-95](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html) — Improper Neutralization of Directives in Eval |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#7) |
+
+**Affected components:**
+
+| File | Line(s) | Context |
+|------|---------|---------|
+| `bot/cogs/commands/calc.py` | 92 | User-supplied expression |
+| `bot/cogs/commands/autorole.py` | 235, 268, 306, 339 | DB-persisted list parsing |
+
+**Impact:** Local RCE if an attacker can write SQLite records or abuse calculator input validation gaps.
+
+**Remediation:** AST-limited math evaluator; JSON/`ast.literal_eval` for structured data.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-008 — Runtime Dependency Installation & Binary Fetch
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Medium |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-829](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/829.html) — Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#8) |
+
+**Affected components:** `bot/utils/tunnel.py`, `bot/utils/paginators.py`
+
+**Description:** Application invokes `pip install` via `os.system` and downloads `cloudflared` from GitHub at runtime.
+
+**Impact:** Supply-chain compromise if upstream artifact is tampered; violates principle of immutable deployments.
+
+**Remediation:** Declare dependencies in `requirements.txt`; opt-in binary download via `TUNNEL_ALLOW_BINARY_DOWNLOAD=true`.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-009 — Deceptive User-Facing Commands
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Medium (Social Engineering) |
+| **CWE** | [CWE-451](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/451.html) — User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information |
+| **Status at review** | Open → Remediated (#9) |
+
+**Affected component:** `bot/cogs/commands/general.py`
+
+| Command | Behavior | Actual harm |
+|---------|----------|-------------|
+| `hack @user` | Fabricated credentials | None |
+| `token @user` | Random 59-char string | None |
+| `wizz` | Simulated destruction UI | None |
+
+**Impact:** No technical exploitation; reputational and social-engineering risk.
+
+**Remediation:** Remove or clearly label as parody commands.
+
+---
+
+### ZYROX-2026-010 — Developer Branding & Dormant Telemetry Hooks
+
+| Attribute | Value |
+|-----------|-------|
+| **Severity** | Low / Informational |
+| **Status at review** | Acknowledged — no code change required |
+
+**Description:** >100 files contain CodeX branding headers (`discord.gg/codexdev`). Commented `autoblacklist` cog references external support channel. Help footers link to developer Discord.
+
+**Impact:** No direct exploitation path; increases fingerprinting and social-trust surface.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Finding Summary Matrix
+
+| ID | Title | Severity | Exploitability | Data Impact | Remediation Priority |
+|----|-------|----------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|
+| ZYROX-2026-001 | Hardcoded owner fallback | Critical | Trivial (default deploy) | Full bot control | P0 |
+| ZYROX-2026-002 | Jishaku RCE | Critical | Requires owner access | Host compromise | P0 |
+| ZYROX-2026-003 | Command webhook telemetry | Critical | Passive (default URL) | User/guild metadata | P0 |
+| ZYROX-2026-004 | Hardcoded log channels | High | Passive | Guild intelligence | P1 |
+| ZYROX-2026-005 | Exposed FastAPI + tunnel | High | Requires key/network | Config takeover | P1 |
+| ZYROX-2026-006 | Client-exposed API key | High | Trivial (view source) | Config takeover | P1 |
+| ZYROX-2026-007 | eval() injection | Medium | Conditional | Local RCE | P2 |
+| ZYROX-2026-008 | Runtime pip/binary fetch | Medium | Supply-chain | Integrity | P2 |
+| ZYROX-2026-009 | Deceptive commands | Medium | Social | None (technical) | P2 |
+| ZYROX-2026-010 | Branding / telemetry hooks | Low | N/A | N/A | P3 |
+
+---
+
+## 5. Pre-Deployment Checklist (Operator)
+
+### P0 — Before first production start
+
+- [ ] Set `OWNER_IDS` to operator-controlled Discord account(s)
+- [ ] Verify no third-party IDs in `.env` or `.env.example`
+- [ ] Confirm `JISHAKU_ENABLED` is unset or `false`
+- [ ] Leave `CMD_WEBHOOK_URL` empty unless operator-owned
+- [ ] Replace or unset all hardcoded log channel IDs
+
+### P1 — Before exposing dashboard/API
+
+- [ ] Generate cryptographically strong `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` (≥32 bytes entropy)
+- [ ] Set `API_HOST=127.0.0.1`; enable tunnel only if required
+- [ ] Confirm API key is **not** prefixed with `NEXT_PUBLIC_`
+- [ ] Validate Discord OAuth permission checks on guild routes
+
+### P2 — Hardening
+
+- [ ] Audit SQLite file permissions on `bot/db/`
+- [ ] Review `eval()` replacements in calculator/autorole modules
+- [ ] Pin dependencies; disable runtime installs
+- [ ] Remove or relabel parody moderation commands
+
+---
+
+## Appendix A — Repository Structure
+
+### A.1 Root
+
+| Path | Description |
+|------|-------------|
+| `bot/` | Python Discord bot, FastAPI, SQLite persistence |
+| `dashboard/` | Next.js 14+ dashboard with NextAuth |
+| `PROJEKT_ANALYSE.md` | This report |
+| `SECURITY_FIXES.md` | Remediation advisory |
+
+### A.2 Bot Core (`bot/`)
+
+| Component | Role |
+|-----------|------|
+| `CodeX.py` | Process entry: bot, API thread, optional tunnel |
+| `core/zyrox.py` | `AutoShardedBot` subclass, prefix resolution |
+| `utils/config.py` | Centralized environment configuration |
+| `api/` | FastAPI REST layer for dashboard |
+| `cogs/` | Feature modules (~80+ extensions) |
+| `db/` | Per-module SQLite databases |
+
+### A.3 Bot API Routes (`bot/api/`)
+
+| Route group | Capability |
+|-------------|------------|
+| `/api/v1/guilds/*` | Guild-scoped configuration CRUD |
+| `/api/v1/admin/*` | Global stats, maintenance mode |
+| `/api/v1/bot/*` | Bot status |
+
+**Authentication (post-remediation):** Bearer `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` + `X-Discord-Access-Token` with guild permission validation.
+
+### A.4 Dashboard (`dashboard/`)
+
+OAuth via NextAuth → guild list intersection (bot present ∧ user has Manage Guild) → proxied API calls to bot backend.
+
+Key paths: `app/dashboard/guild/[guildId]/*`, `app/api/proxy/[...path]/route.ts`, `lib/api.ts`.
+
+---
+
+## Appendix B — Persistence Layer
+
+| Database | Contents |
+|----------|----------|
+| `prefix.db` | Per-guild command prefixes |
+| `automod.db` | Automod rule configuration |
+| `block.db` | Global user/guild denylist |
+| `leveling.db` | XP and rank data |
+| `tickets.db`, `welcome.db`, `antinuke.db`, `verification.db` | Module configs |
+| `admin_config.db` | Maintenance mode flag |
+
+All databases are local SQLite files under `bot/db/`. No encryption at rest observed.
+
+---
+
+## Appendix C — Environment Variables
+
+### Bot (`.env`)
+
+| Variable | Required | Security note |
+|----------|----------|---------------|
+| `TOKEN` | Yes | Discord bot secret — never commit |
+| `OWNER_IDS` | Yes | Must be operator-controlled |
+| `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` | If API enabled | Shared secret; rotate on compromise |
+| `CMD_WEBHOOK_URL` | No | Disable unless operator-owned |
+| `API_ENABLED` / `API_HOST` / `TUNNEL_ENABLED` | No | Secure defaults: off / 127.0.0.1 / off |
+| `JISHAKU_ENABLED` | No | Default: false |
+
+### Dashboard (`.env`)
+
+| Variable | Required | Security note |
+|----------|----------|---------------|
+| `DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET` | Yes | Server-side only |
+| `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` | Yes | Server-side only — **not** `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` |
+| `NEXTAUTH_SECRET` | Yes | Session integrity |
+
+---
+
+## Appendix D — Startup Sequence
+
+```
+python bot/CodeX.py
+  ├─ load_dotenv()
+  ├─ FastAPI thread (if API_ENABLED)
+  ├─ Cloudflare tunnel (if TUNNEL_ENABLED)
+  ├─ discord.py client.start(TOKEN)
+  │    ├─ load cogs (~80+)
+  │    ├─ load jishaku (if JISHAKU_ENABLED)
+  │    └─ sync slash commands
+  └─ on_ready → background tasks
+
+npm run dev (dashboard/)
+  ├─ Next.js :3000
+  └─ /api/proxy/* → Bot FastAPI (server-side key)
+```
+
+---
+
+## 6. Conclusion
+
+ZyroX CV2 AIO is a feature-rich Discord bot platform, not a self-propagating malware sample. The primary security concern is **deployment-time trust delegation**: unchanged defaults effectively assign operational control and observability to the original publisher.
+
+Operators treating this as production software must treat initial configuration as a **security-critical step**, equivalent to key ceremony for any SaaS deployment.
+
+Remediation details and verification results are documented in **`SECURITY_FIXES.md`** (Advisory ZYROX-SEC-2026-REM).
+
+---
+
+**End of Report**
+
+*For remediation status and patch verification, see `SECURITY_FIXES.md`.*
--- a/PR_DESCRIPTION.md
+++ b/PR_DESCRIPTION.md
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Security: Remove backdoors, enforce secure defaults, and harden API
+
+## Summary
+
+Security audit and hardening of the ZyroX CV2 AIO Discord bot with dashboard. The analysis found **no classic malware**, but several **backdoor-like mechanisms** in the original CodeX configuration (foreign owner IDs, external logging, exposed API, API key leak in the frontend).
+
+This PR addresses **10 security issues** and introduces **secure defaults**: without a proper `.env` configuration, no foreign user retains owner rights, no external logging occurs, and the API is not publicly exposed.
+
+### Fixed Risks
+
+| # | Issue | Fix |
+|---|-------|-----|
+| 1 | Hardcoded foreign `OWNER_IDS` | No fallback — without `.env`, no one has owner rights |
+| 2 | Jishaku (Python REPL) always enabled | Opt-in only via `JISHAKU_ENABLED=true` |
+| 3 | Command logging to external webhooks | Only with a valid, complete `CMD_WEBHOOK_URL` |
+| 4 | Hardcoded Discord channel IDs | Configurable via `LOG_CHANNEL_ID`, etc. |
+| 5 | API bound to `0.0.0.0`, tunnel enabled by default | `API_ENABLED=false`, `API_HOST=127.0.0.1`, `TUNNEL_ENABLED=false` |
+| 6 | API key exposed in browser (`NEXT_PUBLIC_*`) | Server-side proxy in Next.js, key stays server-only |
+| 7 | `eval()` in calculator/autorole | New `safe_parse.py` with AST-based eval and JSON |
+| 8 | Auto `pip install` / binary download | Manual installation, download opt-in only |
+| 9 | Fake commands `hack`/`token`/`wizz` | Removed |
+| 10 | Bot API without Discord permission checks | `discord_auth.py` + token/admin validation |
+
+### Additional Hardening (Follow-up Audit)
+
+- API proxy requires login + guild/admin permission checks
+- Guild list filtered to manageable servers only
+- Fixed crash when `command is None` in `on_command_completion`
+- Server-only `ADMIN_IDS` support added
+
+---
+
+## Breaking Changes / Migration
+
+**Bot (`bot/.env`):**
+
+```env
+TOKEN=...
+OWNER_IDS=YOUR_DISCORD_USER_ID
+DASHBOARD_API_KEY=strong_secret
+```
+
+**Dashboard (`dashboard/.env`):**
+
+```env
+DASHBOARD_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1
+DASHBOARD_API_KEY=same_value_as_bot
+```
+
+Remove `NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY` if still set.
+
+Optional for dashboard/API:
+
+```env
+API_ENABLED=true
+LOG_CHANNEL_ID=...
+```
+
+---
+
+## Test Plan
+
+- [ ] Bot starts without `OWNER_IDS` and shows a warning; owner commands do not work
+- [ ] With `OWNER_IDS` set, owner commands work as expected
+- [ ] Jishaku loads only when `JISHAKU_ENABLED=true`
+- [ ] No webhook logging without a valid `CMD_WEBHOOK_URL`
+- [ ] No join/leave logging without `LOG_CHANNEL_ID`
+- [ ] API disabled by default; when enabled, binds to `127.0.0.1` only
+- [ ] Dashboard API calls go through `/api/proxy` — key not visible in browser
+- [ ] Unauthenticated proxy access is rejected
+- [ ] Guild API requires Discord token + Manage Server/Admin on target guild
+- [ ] Calculator: safe expressions work, injection attempts rejected
+- [ ] `hack`/`token`/`wizz` commands no longer exist
+- [ ] README and `.env.example` (bot + dashboard) updated
+
+---
+
+## Context
+
+Based on the full security analysis in `PROJEKT_ANALYSE.md` and the applied fixes documented in `SECURITY_FIXES.md`.
--- a/SECURITY_FIXES.md
+++ b/SECURITY_FIXES.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+# Security Remediation Advisory
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Advisory ID** | ZYROX-SEC-2026-REM |
+| **Related Report** | [PROJEKT_ANALYSE.md](PROJEKT_ANALYSE.md) (ZYROX-SEC-2026-001) |
+| **Publication Date** | 2026-07-21 |
+| **Status** | Patches applied — operator action required |
+| **Classification** | Internal — Distribution Restricted |
+| **Affected Product** | ZyroX CV2 AIO Discord Bot with Dashboard |
+
+---
+
+## 1. Advisory Summary
+
+This document tracks remediation of findings identified during static security assessment **ZYROX-SEC-2026-001**. Ten primary findings (ZYROX-2026-001 through ZYROX-2026-010) were addressed through configuration hardening, access-control improvements, and code changes. A follow-up review on the same date identified six additional issues in the remediation itself; all were resolved prior to closing this advisory.
+
+**Operator action is still required** post-update: environment files must be created or migrated per Section 6.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Remediation Index
+
+| Fix | Finding ID | Title | Severity | Status |
+|-----|------------|-------|----------|--------|
+| #1 | ZYROX-2026-001 | Hardcoded owner fallback | Critical | ✅ Applied |
+| #2 | ZYROX-2026-002 | Jishaku enabled by default | Critical | ✅ Applied |
+| #3 | ZYROX-2026-003 | Command webhook telemetry | Critical | ✅ Applied |
+| #4 | ZYROX-2026-004 | Hardcoded log channel IDs | High | ✅ Applied |
+| #5 | ZYROX-2026-005 | Over-exposed API defaults | High | ✅ Applied |
+| #6 | ZYROX-2026-006 | Client-exposed API key | High | ✅ Applied |
+| #7 | ZYROX-2026-007 | Unsafe eval() usage | Medium | ✅ Applied |
+| #8 | ZYROX-2026-008 | Runtime pip/binary fetch | Medium | ✅ Applied |
+| #9 | ZYROX-2026-009 | Deceptive commands | Medium | ✅ Applied |
+| #10 | ZYROX-2026-005 (ext.) | Missing Discord auth on API | High | ✅ Applied |
+
+---
+
+## 3. Patch Details
+
+### Fix #1 — Remove Hardcoded Owner Fallback
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-001  
+**Root cause:** `_parse_ids()` supplied third-party Discord UID `870179991462236170` when `OWNER_IDS` unset.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/config.py` | `_parse_ids()` returns empty list on missing env var |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | Startup warning when `OWNER_IDS` is empty |
+| `bot/.env.example` | Placeholder `YOUR_DISCORD_USER_ID_HERE`; foreign IDs removed |
+| `dashboard/.env.example` | `ADMIN_IDS` placeholder replaces foreign ID |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** No principal receives owner privileges without explicit configuration. Bot emits warning on empty `OWNER_IDS`.
+
+**Migration:**
+```env
+OWNER_IDS=<your_discord_snowflake>
+```
+
+---
+
+### Fix #2 — Jishaku Opt-In
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-002  
+**Root cause:** Unconditional `load_extension("jishaku")` at startup.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/config.py` | `JISHAKU_ENABLED` flag (default: `false`) |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | Conditional extension load |
+| `bot/.env.example` | Documented opt-in flag |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** Jishaku inactive unless `JISHAKU_ENABLED=true`. Recommended for local debugging only.
+
+---
+
+### Fix #3 — Webhook URL Validation
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-003  
+**Root cause:** Command logging fired on placeholder or empty webhook URLs.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/config.py` | `_valid_webhook_url()` rejects empty/placeholder values |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | `on_command_completion` early-return when URL invalid |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** No outbound command telemetry without fully qualified, operator-configured webhook URL.
+
+---
+
+### Fix #4 — Externalize Log Channel IDs
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-004  
+**Root cause:** Hardcoded snowflakes (`1396794297386532978`, etc.) in multiple modules.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/config.py` | `LOG_CHANNEL_ID`, `SERVER_COUNT_CHANNEL_ID`, `USER_COUNT_CHANNEL_ID` |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | Config-driven channel references; stats task gated on config |
+| `bot/cogs/events/on_guild.py` | Join/leave logging conditional on `LOG_CHANNEL_ID` |
+| `bot/cogs/commands/np.py` | Audit logs use `LOG_CHANNEL_ID` |
+| `bot/.env.example` | Optional IDs documented (commented) |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** Zero external telemetry channels unless explicitly configured.
+
+**Migration (optional):**
+```env
+LOG_CHANNEL_ID=<channel_snowflake>
+SERVER_COUNT_CHANNEL_ID=<channel_snowflake>
+USER_COUNT_CHANNEL_ID=<channel_snowflake>
+```
+
+---
+
+### Fix #5 — Secure API Defaults
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-005  
+**Root cause:** API enabled on `0.0.0.0`; tunnel enabled by default.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/config.py` | `API_ENABLED=false`, `API_HOST=127.0.0.1`, `TUNNEL_ENABLED=false` |
+| `bot/CodeX.py` | Bind to `API_HOST`; warn on `0.0.0.0` |
+| `bot/.env.example` | Secure defaults documented |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** API and tunnel disabled until explicitly enabled. Localhost binding by default.
+
+**Migration (dashboard use case):**
+```env
+API_ENABLED=true
+API_HOST=127.0.0.1
+DASHBOARD_API_KEY=<cryptographically_random_secret>
+```
+
+---
+
+### Fix #6 — Server-Side API Proxy
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-006  
+**Root cause:** `NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY` inlined into browser bundle.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `dashboard/app/api/proxy/[...path]/route.ts` | **New** — authenticated server-side proxy |
+| `dashboard/lib/api.ts` | Client → `/api/proxy`; SSR → direct with server env |
+| `dashboard/.env.example` | `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` (server-only); public key removed |
+
+**Post-patch architecture:**
+```
+Browser  →  GET /api/proxy/guilds/...  →  Next.js (session)  →  Bot API + Bearer token
+SSR      →  Bot API direct (process.env.DASHBOARD_API_KEY)
+```
+
+**Migration:**
+```env
+DASHBOARD_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1
+DASHBOARD_API_KEY=<same_value_as_bot_env>
+```
+Remove `NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY` from any existing `.env`.
+
+---
+
+### Fix #7 — Replace eval() with Safe Parsers
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-007  
+**Root cause:** Dynamic evaluation of user input and DB-stored strings.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/safe_parse.py` | **New** — `safe_math_eval()`, `parse_role_id_list()`, `dump_role_id_list()` |
+| `bot/cogs/commands/calc.py` | AST-limited arithmetic evaluator |
+| `bot/cogs/commands/autorole.py` | JSON / `ast.literal_eval` for list deserialization |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** Calculator restricted to `[0-9+\-*/(). ]`. Autorole lists persisted as JSON with legacy read support.
+
+**Verification:** Unit tests confirm `safe_math_eval('2+2')` succeeds; injection payloads rejected.
+
+---
+
+### Fix #8 — Disable Runtime Package Installation
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-008  
+**Root cause:** `os.system("pip install ...")` and unsolicited `cloudflared` download.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/utils/paginators.py` | ImportError with install instructions (no auto-pip) |
+| `bot/utils/tunnel.py` | Binary download gated on `TUNNEL_ALLOW_BINARY_DOWNLOAD=true` |
+| `bot/.env.example` | `TUNNEL_ALLOW_BINARY_DOWNLOAD=false` |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** Dependencies declared in `requirements.txt`; runtime installs removed.
+
+---
+
+### Fix #9 — Remove Deceptive Commands
+
+**Finding:** ZYROX-2026-009  
+**Root cause:** Commands simulating credential theft and server destruction.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/cogs/commands/general.py` | Removed `hack`, `token`, `wizz`; dead code cleanup |
+| `bot/cogs/zyrox/general.py` | Help index updated |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** Commands no longer registered. No regression in remaining general commands.
+
+---
+
+### Fix #10 — Discord Permission Enforcement on Bot API
+
+**Finding:** Extension of ZYROX-2026-005 (identified in follow-up review)  
+**Root cause:** API accepted bearer token alone; no guild-scoped authorization.
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `bot/api/discord_auth.py` | **New** — token validation, Manage Guild / Admin checks |
+| `bot/api/server.py` | Middleware on `/api/v1/guilds`, `/api/v1/admin`, `/api/v1/bot` |
+| `bot/api/routes/guilds.py` | `GET /guilds` filtered to authorized guilds |
+| `dashboard/lib/api.ts` | Forwards `X-Discord-Access-Token` on SSR |
+| `dashboard/app/api/proxy/[...path]/route.ts` | Header passthrough + session enforcement |
+| `bot/.env.example` | `DASHBOARD_ADMIN_IDS` documented |
+| `README.md`, `bot/README.md`, `dashboard/README.md` | Secure configuration guidance |
+
+**Post-patch behavior:** Guild-scoped endpoints require valid Discord OAuth token with Manage Guild or Administrator permission on target guild.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Follow-Up Review (2026-07-21)
+
+Secondary pass on remediation code identified gaps in the initial proxy implementation. All items below were patched same-day.
+
+| Issue | Severity | Resolution |
+|-------|----------|------------|
+| API proxy accessible without session | Critical | Session gate + guild/admin validation in proxy route |
+| Guild dashboard pages lacking authZ check | High | `guild/[guildId]/layout.tsx` enforces Discord permissions |
+| `GET /guilds` returned all bot guilds | High | Proxy filters to user-manageable intersection |
+| `on_command_completion` NullPointer on `command is None` | Medium | Guard clause in `CodeX.py` |
+| Orphaned `jishaku` import in `bot/core/zyrox.py` | Low | Import removed |
+| Admin check relied solely on `NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_IDS` | Medium | Server-side `ADMIN_IDS` supported |
+
+---
+
+## 5. Verification & Test Results
+
+| Test | Method | Result |
+|------|--------|--------|
+| Python syntax | `py_compile` on modified modules | Pass |
+| Safe parser unit tests | `safe_parse` test suite | Pass — arithmetic OK, injection blocked |
+| Hardcoded channel ID grep | Static scan of `bot/` | Pass — no hardcoded snowflakes in code paths |
+| Public API key exposure | Grep `NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY` | Pass — removed from code and examples |
+| Proxy auth bypass (manual) | Unauthenticated request to `/api/proxy/*` | Pass — 401/403 |
+
+**Regression scope:** General commands, guild config API, dashboard OAuth flow. No automated E2E suite present at time of review.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Operator Deployment Checklist
+
+Execute after pulling patched codebase:
+
+| Step | Action | Required |
+|------|--------|----------|
+| 1 | Create/update `bot/.env` with `TOKEN`, `OWNER_IDS` | Yes |
+| 2 | Create/update `dashboard/.env` with server-only `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` | Yes |
+| 3 | Delete `NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_API_KEY` from legacy configs | Yes |
+| 4 | Set `LOG_CHANNEL_ID` etc. if logging desired | Optional |
+| 5 | Enable `API_ENABLED=true` only when dashboard is deployed | Optional |
+| 6 | Set `JISHAKU_ENABLED=true` only for controlled debugging | Optional |
+
+---
+
+## 7. Intentionally Unchanged (Accepted Risk)
+
+| Item | Rationale | Risk Level |
+|------|-----------|------------|
+| Developer credits in `mention.py`, `stats.py` | Cosmetic attribution | Informational |
+| CodeX file headers | Branding | Informational |
+| `discord.gg/codexdev` in welcome templates | Operator-configurable content | Informational |
+
+These items do not constitute exploitable vulnerabilities under the assessed threat model.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Residual Recommendations
+
+| Area | Recommendation | Priority |
+|------|----------------|----------|
+| SQLite at rest | Restrict filesystem permissions on `bot/db/` | P2 |
+| Secret rotation | Rotate `DASHBOARD_API_KEY` and `TOKEN` on suspected compromise | P1 |
+| Dependency pinning | Lock `requirements.txt` / `package-lock.json` hashes | P2 |
+| AutoBlacklist cog | Review before enabling — aggressive auto-ban behavior | P3 |
+| Lavalink | Self-host node; avoid third-party defaults (`lavalink.jirayu.net`) | P3 |
+
+---
+
+## 9. Document History
+
+| Version | Date | Notes |
+|---------|------|-------|
+| 1.0 | 2026-07-21 | Initial remediation (Fixes #1–#9) |
+| 1.1 | 2026-07-21 | Follow-up review + Fix #10 (Discord API authZ) |
+
+---
+
+**End of Advisory**
+
+*Cross-reference: vulnerability details and threat context in [PROJEKT_ANALYSE.md](PROJEKT_ANALYSE.md).*