Enhance API with OIDC support, including login and callback endpoints. Update environment variables for OIDC configuration in .env.example. Add new features to the catalog service for listing software families, Minecraft versions, and deployment regions. Implement server management actions such as kill, delete, and update in the servers module. Integrate feature flags for maintenance mode in server operations. Update pnpm-lock.yaml with new dependencies and versions.

docs/security/container-isolation.md

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+# Container isolation
+
+How HexaHost GameCloud isolates Minecraft server workloads on game nodes.
+
+## Model
+
+Each customer server runs as a **non-privileged Docker container** on a dedicated game node. The node-agent creates and manages containers; customers never receive Docker socket access.
+
+```
+Control plane (trusted)  ──mTLS──►  Node agent (trusted)  ──►  Game container (untrusted)
+```
+
+## Container hardening (target profile)
+
+| Control | Setting |
+|---------|---------|
+| User | Non-root UID inside container |
+| Privileges | `--privileged=false` |
+| Capabilities | Drop ALL, add only required (none for vanilla Java) |
+| seccomp | Docker default or custom profile (Phase 2) |
+| AppArmor | Docker default profile |
+| Network | Bridge network per server; no `host` network mode |
+| Read-only root | Where compatible with selected software family |
+| Memory / CPU | cgroup limits from plan slug |
+| PIDs limit | Prevents fork bombs |
+
+## Network isolation
+
+- Game containers reach the internet for Minecraft auth and mod downloads only through controlled egress
+- No route to control plane PostgreSQL, Redis, or internal APIs
+- Node-agent management port (`9100`) bound to localhost or management VLAN only
+
+See threat T05 and T12 in [threat model](threat-model.md).
+
+## Storage isolation
+
+- Per-server data directory on node disk: `/var/lib/hgc-node/servers/{serverId}/`
+- Path traversal prevented server-side; symlinks rejected on archive extract
+- Backups uploaded to object storage — not readable by other tenants
+
+## Image policy
+
+- Only catalog-approved runtime images (digest-pinned)
+- Customers cannot push custom images
+- Periodic image vulnerability scan in CI (Phase 9)
+
+## Multi-tenant on one node
+
+The scheduler enforces RAM and server count limits per node. There is no shared filesystem between server containers except the read-only image layers.
+
+## Operator responsibilities
+
+| Task | Frequency |
+|------|-----------|
+| Docker security updates on nodes | Monthly |
+| Review AppArmor/seccomp profiles after Minecraft/Java major bumps | Per release |
+| Audit `docker ps` for unexpected privileged containers | Weekly |
+
+Bootstrap hardening via `deploy/ansible/game-node.yml`.
+
+## Verification
+
+- Attempt cross-container network scan from test server (should fail to reach agent port)
+- Confirm `docker inspect` shows `Privileged: false`
+- Penetration test before production go-live
+
+## Related
+
+- [Threat model](threat-model.md)
+- [Game node operations](../operations/game-node.md)
+- [Secrets](secrets.md)